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LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEASES-OPTION IN TENANT TO CANCEL IN
CASE OF GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE WITH UsE OF PREMISES-A lease
of real property for an automobile service station contained a provision for termination of the leasehold at the option of the tenant in case "the use of the said
premises for an oil and gasoline .filling station be prevented, suspended or limited
by any zoning statute or ordinance, or any other municipal or governmental action." Held, this clause applied to release the tenant when wartime rationing
of gasoline and tires made it unprofitable for him to operate the .filling station.

1944}

RECENT DECISIONS

Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation

'ii.

Barrett, (Ky. Ct. App. 1944) 181

S.W. (2d) 60.
"Generally speaking, the courts have declined to relieve tenants from the
obligation of their commercial leases because of the fact that the volume of business transacted has been curtailed as a result of Federal rationing laws." 1
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation 'ii. Barrett raises the question whether
in the situation where the lease itself provides for termination by the tenant in
case the use of the premises for the purposes designated in the lease shall be impaired or restricted by operation of law, the tenant is released if the volume of his
business is reduced due to wartime rationing regulations. The answer hinges
upon the interpretation to be given a clause in the lease contract such as that in
the instant case. Paragraph l 3 of the lease read: "If during the term of this
lease, or any extension thereof, the use of the said premises for an oil and gasoline
filling station be prevented, suspended or limited by any zoning statute, or ordinance, or any other municipal or governmental action or valid law, ordinance
or regulation; or the use of said premises be affected or impaired by the widening,
altering or improving of any streets fronting or adjoining said premises, then
lessee may cancel this lease by giving thirty (30) days written notice to lessor." 2
If the intention of the parties when they entered into the contract is to control
the construction to be given this provision it would seem that Mrs. Barrett and
the Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, when they inserted that clause into
their lease in I 926, had no thought of the possibility of war interfering with the
business to be conducted upon the demised premises. The clause was probably
meant to apply to laws or regulations affecting the local area or particular piece
of property upon which the service station in question was situated. This argument was apparently advanced, but the Kentucky court rejected it saying,_
"Doubtless war, with all its tragic consequences, was far from the expectation of
the parties, but the language used in expressing the conditions upon which the
lessee's option to terminate the lease rests is sweeping in its reach, both with respect to cause and results. We cannot agree with the appellee that the language
must be construed as applicable only to interference with the occupancy of the
premises." 8 However, it would seem arguable that a more definite provision
should be required to excuse the tenant. As pointed out in a recent New York
case, 4 if the parties had intended the lease to cover such a situation "they could
readily have provided for cancellation of the lease in the event of a regulation of
the defendant's business by employing language to that effect. Were we to accept defendant's interpretation of the agreement, any rule, order, or regulation
of public authority even of temporary duration which might affect defendant's
business and restrict its profits would allow defendant to cancel the lease. . . .
The federal regulations do not restrict the use of the land demised but they control the business of the defendant." 5 In Robitzek Investing Co. v. Colomal
Beacon Oil Co. the lease read, "It is understood and agreed that if for reason of
any law, ordinance, injunction or regulation of properly constituted authority,
1

147 A.L.R. 1273 at 1274 (1943).
8
Principal case at 61.
Id. at 62.
4
Robitzek Investing Co. v. Colonial Beacon Oil Co., 264 App. Div. 749, 40
N.Y.S. (2d) 819 (1943).
5
Id. at 822.
2
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Lessee is prevented from using all or any part of the property herein leased
as a service station for the storage, handling, advertising or sale of gasoline or other petroleum products . . . or if the use of the premises herein
demised shall he in any manner restricted for any of the purposes above stated ••.
the Lessee may, at its option, surrender and cancel this lease." 6 Despite this
provision, the court ruled "the clause has reference to a law or order regulating
not the defendant's business, but the use of the premises as such; it refers to a
real property restriction." 7 It is submitted that the interpretation given by the
New York court is the better view. Nothing in the rationing regulations affected
or restricted the physical use to which the property could be put. The lessee was
still free to operate a filling station on the premises. It is difficult to see how the
use of the property is affected by the wartime rationing regulations. There were
no'limitations upon the right to sell gas and oil on the premises in question. The
governmental restrictions are upon the consumption of petroleum and rubber
products. Such clauses in leases generally refer to zoning ordinances and laws
which will affect the particular piece of property demised as a business site.
Changes of law such as rationing regulations, higher taxes on gas and oil, apply
alike to all engaged in the business. They do not affect any particular entre• preneur's competitive position in the market. These contingencies would seem
to be part of the fluctuations of business and a risk which the lesse,e assumes.
What he does not assume is that his position in relation to others operating in the
same m!1rket will be changed. Hence he provides against it by contract.8 In
First National Bank of New Rochelle v. Fairchester Oil Co. the court declared,
"The clause above quoted [a similarly worded tenant's option to cancel] must
be held to relate to possible real estate restrictions which might limit the use of
the premises, but does not relate to a regulation limiting the volume of business
of the defendant." 9 The Kentucky court attempts to distinguish the MidPetroleum case from the Robitzek lease.1° It adopts a broad view of the scope of
the cancellation clause and rejects the restrictive interpretation of "use" con6

Id at 821.
Id. at 822.
8
Buell v. Indian Refining Co., 62 Ohio App. 108, 23 N.E. (2d) 329 (1939)
cited by the Kentucky court, was a case of the rerouting of a highway which cut off
much of lessee's business. Under a clause in the lease that the tenant could terminate
if the "use of said premises as an oil and gasoline filling station be prevented, suspended, or impaired .•. by the widening, altering, or improving of any street or highway fronting, or adjoining, said premises" the court held the tenant had a right
to cancel. It would seem that the case is distinguishable from the Mid-Continent lease.
In the Buell case governmental action affected that filling station alone and not service
stations all over the nation.
9
267 App. Div. 281, 45 N.Y.S. (2d) 532 at 533 _{1943).
10 Referring to the New York decision, the court said at page 63, "The provision
of that lease was not so broad as the one we have before us. • • . Only the words 'prevented' and 'restricted' were employed. They are usually used in speaking of property,
while the words 'suspended or limited' have no such co,nnotation." The argument was
also advanced in the Kentucky case at page 64 that "where a grant is doubtful it will be
construed in favor of the grantee," the court quoting from 32 AM. JuR. L. & T. at
§ 831, and therefore, applying this doctrine to leases, the cancellation clause should be
construed in favor of the tenant and he should be released from his covenant.
7
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tended for by the lessor. The. cases may perhaps be distinguished on their faces,
but in principle they would seem opposed to one another.
Margaret Groefsema (S. Ed.)

